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ABSTRACT
Contrary to traditional economic theory, studies have demonstrated how temporary
increases in discretionary income can alter consumption habits of individuals. Furthermore,
research has shown that spending on non-necessities, such as entertainment, can be influenced by
increases in discretionary income as well as several other factors. This study attempts to analyze
this relationship and whether a shift in the timing of tax refunds due to the PATH Act has
changed entertainment spending in households. Using Consumer Expenditures Survey interview
data, this paper will attempt to answer this question by focusing on households who obtained the
EITC and ACTC. Although no statistically significant results were found in the main analysis,
recurring patterns in the data challenged assumptions and expectations. Drops in entertainment
spending across March 2015 and March 2016 despite an overall growth in entertainment
expenditures, for example, demonstrates the need for further analysis.
Keywords: Consumption, entertainment spending, PATH Act, tax refunds
Disciplines: Behavioral Economics | Public Policy

3

INTRODUCTION
In December of 2015, the Patriots Against Tax Hikes (PATH) Act was enacted. Most of
the provisions in the PATH Act merely reestablished existing thresholds for households
attempting to obtain the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Additional Child Tax Credit
(ACTC). One of the provisions, however, changed the timing of when many of these households
would obtain their tax refunds (IRS, 2019). This singular provision allows for an analysis of
whether shifts in tax refunds also shift spending.
More importantly, households receiving these tax refunds due to these tax credits tend to
fall on the lower to moderate-income thresholds (IRS, 2019) . Studies of low-income households
have demonstrated how ‘cycles of scarcity’ can cause them to behave suboptimally in terms of
financial decisions (Feinberg, 2015). Research ultimately concluded that both a combination of
limited mental bandwidth and worry of not having enough money can reduce cognitive capacity
and lead to self-destructive habits (Mullainathan, 2013). Despite this research, few studies have
focused on the behavioral consumption response among low-income households when
anticipating a temporary income change. Even less research has been conducted on the direct
relationship that tax refunds can have on entertainment spending. Across 2015 and 2016, there
was a 3% total growth rate in average entertainment expenditures and from 2016 to 2017, there
was a drastic 10% growth rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). Given the industry trends and
drastic increases in entertainment consumption throughout the past decade, this relationship
would be an important one to study. Moreover, the intersection of the types of households
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obtaining these refunds along with the ways in which entertainment spending diverges from
traditional economic theory highlights the ways in which this research can be beneficial.
My research question will therefore focus on whether lower-income households use
anticipated increases in discretionary income to increase spending on entertainment and whether
the PATH Act influenced shifts in spending. This will also indirectly examine whether
lower-income households properly smooth entertainment consumption leading up to the
anticipated change. I hope to use tax refund income as a proxy for anticipated discretionary
income changes by these households. The data used will come from the Consumer Expenditures
Survey (CEX) as many papers in this field of study have used the interview data for similar
analyses. This research will either confirm or contradict the notion found in other studies that
low-income households smooth consumption suboptimally. The primary goal of this research is
to better understand how anticipated changes in income, such as tax refunds, change
consumption behaviors in entertainment among these households.
Borrowing and adjusting on some of the methodologies presented in similar papers, this
research will use regression analysis to determine the effect that shifts in timing of refunds have
on entertainment spending. Although none of the results were statistically significant in the
original analysis, the patterns found in the data are promising and demonstrate the need for
further research.

5

LITERATURE REVIEW
I.

Divergence from Traditional Economic Theory
Traditional economic theory asserts that consumption is not influenced by temporary

increases or decreases in income, but this assumption is not always accurate. Established through
the introduction of Milton Friedman’s Permanent Income Hypothesis (1957), this assumption
suggests that temporary increases in income will ultimately have negligible effects on overall
consumption. Ideally, households will attempt to smooth consumption across all time periods in
order to maximize utility. This means that households should be borrowing in their early years,
paying off their debts and saving in the middle, and then using their savings to consume in their
later years. Moreover, versions of the Relative Income Hypothesis suggest that consumption
decisions of households are determined by previous consumption behaviors and that temporary
decreases in income will not lead to an overall reduction in consumption (Duesenberry, 1949).
Nevertheless, expected temporary changes in income have led to noticeable differences in
consumption patterns of households (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995). After the 2003 United States
tax cut, for example, high-income households who had prior knowledge of the tax rebates they
would be receiving were more likely to spend their additional income rather than save it
(Coronado et al., 2005). Furthermore, some studies have demonstrated that households tend to
adjust their consumption behaviors not when they learn of expected tax cuts, but rather, when
they receive the payments (Wilcox, 1989). Using tax refunds as a proxy for increases in expected
discretionary income, these findings differ from traditional economic models and demonstrate
some of the many other factors that influence consumption decisions. The assumption that
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consumers are rational and selfish, one of the foundations of traditional economic theories, is
therefore challenged with many of these results.

II. Changes in Consumption Due to Tax Refunds
Research relating to changes in consumption that are directly tied to tax refunds
demonstrate how differently households consume compared to what would be economically
rational. Several studies have found that tax refunds stimulate a myriad of different behaviors,
from savings to paying down debt to increasing overall consumption (Coronado et al., 2003;
Stephens, 2008; and Zhang, 2017). A similar paper, which focused on responses related to
changes in social security taxes across distinct periods, found that these increases in consumption
are in part due to a 20% increase in non-durable consumption (Parker, 1999). A comparable
study based in Italy, on the other hand, found that expected tax rebates caused increases in food
and durable consumption (Neri et al., 2015). Furthermore, another study concluded that
households spent a majority of anticipated tax refunds on durable goods (Souleles, 1999).
Although the amount of consumption that increases due to durable as opposed to non-durable
good expenditures differ among different studies, they are both correlated with income-levels
given that low-income households tend to have greater expenditure responses (Johnson et al.,
2006). Correspondingly, lower income households have been found to change their consumption
by a much greater scale as a result of tax refunds. These findings highlight the differences among
distinct income levels that get lost when aggregating overall changes in consumption, which is
commonly done in most studies in this field. It also highlights low-income households’ liquidity
constraints, whereas not having enough economic resources makes it difficult for them to defer
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consumption and save money or pay off debt (Beverly, 1997). Due to many of these constraints,
temporary increases in discretionary income as a result of tax refunds would allow for these
households to fill in gaps in consumption that they may have otherwise not been able to afford or
been allowed to borrow to fill. Additionally, increased consumption reactions to expected
increases of discretionary income in a study focused on the repayment of a car loans further
demonstrated that low-income households have borrowing constraints which limit their
consumption patterns in these situations (Stephens, 2008). Nonetheless, in understanding the
consumption patterns of low-income households, perceptions of overall changes in wealth may
matter more than actual changes in absolute wealth (Epley et al., 2006). As long as households
believe that this change in taxes will change overall wealth rather than income, they will most
likely spend more even if this is not the realistic case. Although due to lack of information or
households misunderstanding the impact these changes will have on overall wealth, this skewed
perception and the actions that result are at odds with the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
Moreover, framing a tax refund as either a “bonus” or a “rebate” led to drastic changes in how
individuals would theoretically save or consume; those primed with a bonus were more likely to
spend the money whereas those primed with a rebate were most likely to save the additional
income (Epley et al., 2006). Additionally, merely increases in pay frequencies as opposed to
changes in overall income have also been shown to increase consumption in households (Zhang,
2017). These findings add a behavioral component to traditional economic theory and, with
liquidity and borrowing constraints, can help address issues relating to how low-income
households spend additional discretionary income.
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Separately, studies have demonstrated that low-income households are likely to use tax
refunds to pay debt. Mendenhall et al. (2012) used a survey to gauge the intended places where
these low-income households would spend their refunds. 72 percent of families that were
surveyed planned to use their refunds to pay down debt and their bills while 84 percent ended up
actually following through (Mendenhall et al., 2012). While the data is self-reported, regional,
and aggregated at times, it demonstrates a willingness by households to use these refunds to pay
off debt. Similarly, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has been shown to have several
positive effects on households, such as boosting employment of single mothers, but it has also
shown to affect debt repayment (Marr et al., 2015). Schaefer et al. (2013) found in their study
that EITC expansions in 1990 led to more unsecured debt repayments by households of single
mothers. Therefore, changes in tax credit policies have shifted the ways in which households
spend their refunds or whether they use them to save or pay down debts. These findings are
important in understanding the tradeoff households face when deciding between entertainment
spending and other forms of consumption, or paying down debt and saving.
On a much more granular level, however, temporary changes in discretionary income
have been linked to increases in entertainment spending (Stephens, 2008). Consumption of
entertainment by households differ due to much of these expenditures being experience-based
and driven by unique individual preferences. Consequently, understanding how consumption of
entertainment differs from other types of spending, across time periods, and between different
types of households, will better frame the analysis put forth in this study.
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III. Consumption of Entertainment by Households
Studies have shown that increasing amounts of time available for leisure across past
decades have equated to more discretionary income spent on entertainment spending (Schwenk,
1992). Entertainment, however, has had a complex relationship with discretionary spending.
Historical research, for example, established the idea that the emergence of cinematic
entertainment and many other forms of innovative new forms of consuming entertainment were
demand-driven (Bakker, 2007). Therefore, breakthroughs in the consumption of entertainment
were created to address the need for these households to spend more of their leisure time on
experiential activities. Interestingly, as Bakker (2007) found, through the emergence of these
entertainment technologies, households began allocating more of their spending towards these
segments at the expense of other entertainment platforms. These results were similar to Hong’s
study (2004), which found that cross-price elasticities demonstrated that changes in prices of
other entertainment goods affected the price of music recordings. Consequently, these findings
imply a deep relationship among different types of entertainment whereas prices of unrelated
industries can affect the amount of consumption allocated to them by households.
Much more generally, however, past research has highlighted several trends within
entertainment spending. Those aged between 35-54, for example, spend more on entertainment
on average than do those over 54 years old or under 35 (Tseng, 2003). This, however, may be
connected due to increases in income and leisure time during this period of time in individuals’
lives. Nonetheless, the amount spent on entertainment of those over 54, when a majority for this
segment are in retirement and have much more leisure time than any other group, is not as high
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as middle adulthood. Due to retirement income constraints, this may also imply that
discretionary income is therefore much more important in determining entertainment spending
than available leisure time. Tseng’s research (2003) also quantitatively solidified and supported
the idea that those with higher overall incomes have higher discretionary incomes and therefore
spend much more on entertainment on average. In terms of the Permanent Income Hypothesis,
these findings are important due to highlighting the ways in which households may not smooth
entertainment consumption across time periods. However, this phenomenon may not be
equatable to traditional economic theories due to discretionary spending not being a concept that
was specifically mentioned in these theories (Crouch et al., 2007). Spending differences within
this spending category can therefore be explained by much more preferential reasons. For
example, spending on necessities may maximize utility at a greater rate than entertainment
spending across different periods, which may help to explain why this entertainment spending
fluctuates. Other explanations for this phenomenon might be due to credit constraints, whereas
studies have shown that households that are credit constrained or unable to borrow money are
less likely to spend on entertainment than on necessities (Cole et al., 2008). Other constraint
factors, such as time and sociodemographic characteristics, have also been associated with
similar entertainment spending categories, such as leisure travel (Hong, 2005).
For the purposes of this study, it is critical to also understand specific quantifiable
entertainment consumption behaviors that results from increases in discretionary income.
Research has previously attempted to quantify the amount of entertainment spending in relation
to other categories. Households, for example, have been found to aim for 9% of their
discretionary income to go to categories such as home entertainment and leisure activities
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(Crouch et al., 2007). Moreover, when this discretionary income goes down as a whole and
budget-cutting occurs, households are much more likely to lower entertainment spending for
services that require transportation (Pyo et al., 1991). On the other hand, effects on entertainment
spending due to temporary increases in discretionary income with events such as tax refunds
have not been studied much. Nonetheless, one study found that those who received the Earned
Income Tax Credit were just as likely to spend on entertainment as households with similar
characteristics who did not receive this credit (Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan, 2008). This
same study conducted by Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008) also found that there was an
86% probability of the respondents who received the EITC to ultimately use part of their tax
refunds for entertainment spending. The Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), however, differs
from the EITC due to not being limited to those with lower income levels (Hungerford and
Thiess, 2013). As the Methodology will further explain, this differentiation will not matter given
that those receiving tax refunds in the dataset are mostly lower-income. In summary, though,
these findings are the most aligned with the purposes of this study and the research questions it
aims to answer.

IV. Summary
All in all, the present literature in this field is able to highlight several key points. First,
increases in consumption due to temporary and expected increases in income are common
despite the Permanent Income Hypothesis being at odds with these findings. Second, differences
in consumption patterns, including entertainment spending, can sometimes be explained by
income levels. Some examples are the liquidity and borrowing constraints low-income
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households face. Third, the framing of these expected temporary increases in income can lead to
differences in the way households respond and are key to understanding expected consumption
responses. Fourth, research has shown that increases in discretionary income lead to more
spending on entertainment and budget-cutting can affect some types of entertainment spending.
More importantly, however, households that received refunds and obtained the EITC had a high
probability of spending part of their tax refunds on entertainment. Lastly, while some of the
research is done using experiments, much is based off survey response data, such as the
Michigan Surveys of Consumers (MSC) and the Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX).
As such, current literature seems to point to there being an increase in consumption
across lower and middle-income households when expecting temporary increases to their
income. In addition, liquidity and borrowing constraints, as well as uncertainty of
unemployment, may also help to explain how these households make decisions in consuming
these rebates and tax refunds. Furthermore, gaps in research paved the way for the analysis
conducted in this study. Research focused on the effects that occurred due to the Patriots Against
Tax Hikes (PATH) Act is almost nonexistent and mostly comes from economic think tanks in
the form of broad legal reviews. Understanding the interactions between timing of refunds of
those who qualify for the EITC and ACTC and entertainment spending can be helpful in adding
to current literature aimed at exploring this relationship. Still, the lack of studies directly tying
entertainment spending and refund amounts demonstrated a research opportunity. Through my
research, I hope to explore the latter and expand on already published papers to answer whether
households affected by the PATH Act changed their entertainment spending as a result of
deferment of tax refunds.
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MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH
I.

Effect of Discretionary Income on Entertainment Spending
Due to entertainment spending being considered a non-necessity, households use their

discretionary income in order to consume entertainment products ranging from video games to
entertainment equipment to admissions to theme parks. Consequently, fluctuations in
discretionary income are directly correlated with entertainment spending (Tseng, 2003). During
recessions and economic downturns, discretionary income decreases for many households due to
pay cuts and unemployment. As a result, companies aiming to provide entertainment services to
households are sometimes hit the hardest by these downturns (Boorstin, 2008). For example,
during the 2008 recession, Walt Disney Company shares slid in price when they reported a sharp
decline in hotel bookings and advertising revenue (Keating, 2008). As a result, many of these
entertainment companies have begun both diversifying their portfolio of intellectual property and
have expanded their offerings in order to capture a greater share of discretionary income and
mitigate against these potential economic downturns. Moreover, due to the digitalization of
entertainment viewing, advertising revenues have declined for the industry as a whole. A study
conducted by PwC demonstrated that this has further shifted revenue streams of these
entertainment companies to being more reliant on expenditures that come directly from
consumers (Vollmer, 2018). Therefore, a focus on capturing market share of discretionary
income from lower and middle-class households has allowed many entertainment conglomerates
to keep their competitive advantage.
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Tax refunds have been generally viewed as a form of discretionary income that stimulates
consumption, although data results regarding how tax refunds are used by households is mixed
(Edwards, 2016). Therefore, analyzing the relationship between this form of discretionary
income and entertainment can have widespread implications for the entertainment industry.
Understanding whether tax refunds are used heavily towards entertainment purchases would
allow companies to begin to take advantage of this trend in order to capture greater market share
during the tax season. Moreover, as previously stated, households that obtain refunds as a result
of the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) are generally
on the lower end of the income scale (IRS, 2019). Understanding much more clearly how
lower-middle class and low-income households change their entertainment spending behaviors
may also allow entertainment companies to better cater to these markets.

II.

Lack of Previous Academic Research
Discretionary income is one of the single most important factors relating to entertainment

spending for the industry. Although several studies have examined these two variables, research
attempting to understand the relationships between tax refunds and entertainment spending is
limited. Most studies conducted in the field are focused on aggregate, numerical changes in
households’ Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) and durable vs. non-durable good
spending. Consequently, these aggregate analyses often do not make distinctions between
socioeconomic levels or the effect that timing of tax refunds have on entertainment spending by
households. Nonetheless, scholars within the field of behavioral economics have extensively
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studied many other ways in which low-income individual consumption habits differ from
traditional economic theories (Beverly, 1997; Epley et al., 2006).
Therefore, this study aims to add to a growing list of literature that examines the effects
tax refunds have on spending and the implications these actions have on traditional economic
models. Using tax refunds as a proxy for expected temporary increases in discretionary income
further allows for this study to be viewed through several different lenses. Policymakers and the
IRS can benefit from this research in order to better comprehend how tax credits can affect
spending. Directly tying this research to the PATH Act can also begin to shed light on ways in
which small provisions within the piece of legislation affected consumption patterns. Moreover,
from a behavioral economics standpoint, understanding whether these households smooth
entertainment consumption due to expected changes in timing of these refunds can further
demonstrate differences between traditional economic models and reality. Lastly, as stated
previously, the private sector can also benefit substantially from this research. For example,
entertainment companies will be able to predict spending amounts of those who qualify for these
refunds much more clearly. Through all these lenses, it is therefore increasingly clear how
important this type of research can be both within the entertainment industry and in the broader
scheme of legislation affecting timing of tax refunds.
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METHODOLOGY
I.

Research Questions & Hypotheses
This study will quantitatively determine whether households who obtain the Earned

Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) changed their entertainment
consumption behaviors as a result of deferment of when tax refunds are received due to the
Patriots Against Tax Hikes (PATH) Act. If a relationship is found, further analysis will be
conducted in order to better understand the quantifiable amount that this deferment in tax refunds
had as a percentage of after-tax income.

Research Questions:
1) Did households who qualified for the EITC and ACTC and received tax refunds change
their entertainment spending due to changes in timing of the refunds as a result of the
PATH Act?
2) If there are changes, how much of these changes are directly explained by tax refunds?

Hypotheses:
1) Hypothesis 1: There is a change in entertainment spending across the control group
(2015; Pre-PATH Act) and the experimental group (2016; Post-PATH Act)
2) Hypothesis 2: The change in entertainment spending can be explained by the shift in
timing of when these households received their refunds due to the PATH Act
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3) Hypothesis 3: Households defer part of their entertainment spending until they receive
their tax refunds

II.

Data Overview
The data for this study will come from one primary source: The Consumer Expenditures

Survey (CEX). Many similar studies have used the CEX in order to measure changes in
consumption among households (Stephens, 2008; Parker, 1999; Zhang, 2017), which is why the
dataset was chosen to attempt to answer this question. Although thorough, the data used in the
interview dataset pose some problems that have the ability to alter interpretations of the analysis
that will be conducted. These problems are discussed below and the implications they have on
the results are further examined in the Discussion s ection of this paper.
Tax refunds are at the center of this study, therefore the way CEX calculates how taxes
are paid set the time frame for this analysis. Prior to 2013, tax information in CEX was
self-reported which led to some flaws in the data due to households underestimating the amount
of taxes they paid (Geoffrey, 2015). Consequently, the Bureau of Labor Statistics used TAXSIM
as an output based on other self-reported inputs in the survey to obtain a more accurate
representation of the amount of taxes paid by these households. TAXSIM is a model created by
the National Bureau of Economic Research and refers to a collection of local and federal datasets
that implements a microsimulation of U.S. federal and state taxes. The simplified tax calculator
formula for the model is:

Total Taxes Paid = Total Taxes - EITC - ACTC
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Therefore, households with ‘negative’ amounts of taxes paid obtain refunds due to the
sum of EITC and ACTC being greater than taxes owed. In December of 2015, the PATH Act
was enacted which did not include any major tax provisions other than renewing existing
thresholds for the EITC and ACTC. However, the PATH Act included a provision that required
the IRS to hold income tax refunds for recipients of the EITC and ACTC until February 15th
(Margot, 2018). Therefore, in order to understand the effect that this change in tax refund timing
had, only households that qualified for the EITC and ACTC should be included in the data set.
Given the formula within the TAXSIM model in the CEX, this means any household with
negative taxes would qualify for these tax credits and subsequently should be included in the
analysis. Additionally, the CEX changed the way they classified and calculated entertainment
spending on their reporting in 2017. Therefore, this study was constrained to the data available
post-2013, when the way taxes were calculated on the CEX changed, and pre-2017, when the
way in which entertainment spending was calculated changed. Consequently, the control group
used in this analysis is 2015, Pre-PATH Act, and the experimental group is 2016, Post-PATH
Act.
Moreover, the CEX interviews the same Consumer Units (CUs) every quarter for one
year. The CUs are spaced out so that every month in the calendar year is covered, but the same
CUs are only interviewed once every three months. Two of these interview periods had to then
be chosen to indicate a quarter when a CU would have obtained their refund Pre-PATH Act and
Post-PATH act. Those interviewed in March, based on standards set by the CEX, report
spending for the past three months. This means that they would be reporting spending for
December of the prior calendar year, January, and February. Those in the Pre-PATH Act period
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would most likely obtain their tax refunds during this quarter given that households could begin
filing their taxes as early as January 15th in 2015. Additionally, households that expect to receive
refunds are most likely to file first (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches, 2007). Those in the Post-PATH
Act period, however, would not obtain their taxes in this March quarter. Given that the PATH
Act prevented households who obtained the EITC and ACTC from filing taxes before February
15th, they would not obtain their tax refunds before the end of the reported quarter. This is due to
the time in between households filing their taxes and receiving their refund being around three
weeks (Internal Revenue Service, 2019). As a result, in 2016 after the PATH Act was enacted,
these households should be expecting to receive their refunds in March. Those interviewed in
June of 2016, however, are expected to have obtained their tax refunds by the time they reported
their spending on the CEX. This is due to them reporting spending for March, April, and May in
this interview period. Additionally, due to the way in which interviews of CUs are conducted, the
CUs interviewed in March and in June come from the same population sample. For example,
those in March of 2015 and June of 2015 come from the same sample of interview respondents,
but those in the following year come from a different sample of households.
In summary, the control group is therefore the data of those households interviewed
March and June of 2015, Pre-PATH Act, and the experimental group is the data of those
households interviewed in March and June of 2016, Post-PATH Act. Moreover, only CUs with
‘negative’ taxes paid according to the TAXSIM output in the CEX data were included. This
would mean that they were expected to obtain refunds as a result of their EITC and ACTC
exceeding the amount of taxes owed. It would also imply that these CUs were impacted by the
PATH Act since they would be qualifying for these tax credits. Finally, CUs were excluded if the
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total sum of their self-reported entertainment spending in the CEX was zero. In order to obtain a
better picture of behaviors of households who did spend on entertainment, these CUs had to have
been excluded. This exclusion, however, presented some problems in interpreting the results that
are explained later in the Discussion section.
III.

Regression Model Framework
The statistical methodology that will be used in order to test whether changes in timing of

tax refunds affect entertainment spending will follow that introduced by Parker (1999). Several
of the variables were taken directly from the regression framework proposed in the Parker study
(1999). The time period dummy variables, size of family, and income components were all
similar to the model introduced in this paper. Nonetheless, the main difference lies within
Parker’s (1999) paper focusing on percentage changes across spending of the same households.
Due to the data constraints and changes in which households spend on entertainment across
quarters, this same analysis was not possible. Therefore, this methodology will be altered to
reflect changes among different sample populations rather than the same one and will assess
entertainment spending changes rather than overall spending changes. Correspondingly, parts of
this methodology have been taken from other studies that have attempted establish relationships
between increases in temporary discretionary income and spending (Stephens, 2008; Zhang,
2017).
Moreover, the regressions for this study are split up into ‘First Stage’ and ‘Second Stage’
regressions in order to differentiate the hypotheses they are attempting to address. The First
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Stage Regression Model attempts to answer the first hypothesis, while the Second Stage
Regression Model attempts to answer the second and third hypothesis.

First Stage Regression Model1:

C e, t = α1 I t + α2 S t + α3 Rt + α4 Dt=1,2,3,4
Dependent Variable: C e, t , Total Adjusted Entertainment Spending as Reported by the CEX
Entertainment spending is calculated in the CEX by summing the amount of outlays
reported by households for sound systems, sports equipment, toys, cameras, and down payments
on boats and campers. For the purposes of this study, adjusted entertainment spending included
those outlays and added the amount of fees and admissions paid for entertainment services . It
also included the “Other Entertainment” category of this survey which is comprised of
subscriptions, memberships, books, and other related entertainment expenses. This adjusted
entertainment value therefore reflects the sum of all categories that the Consumer Expenditures
Survey classifies as entertainment spending.

Independent Variables:
1) α1 I t , After-Tax Income of Households as Reported by CEX

Throughout the First Stage and Second Stage Regression Model, α refers the the regression coefficients of each
independent variable, including dummy and interaction variables. For α4 and α5, these include four distinct
coefficients for each representing the respective time periods that these dummy variables are reflecting.
Additionally, t represents the time component, whereas the Dependent Variable C(e,t) refers to entertainment
spending of that particular time period. This is differentiated due to the possibility of the same CUs appearing
multiple times in the data due to the way the CEX interviews are conducted. Therefore, only the time component,
rather than specific CUs, matters.
1
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After-tax income is directly correlated with the amount of other discretionary income
households have in order to spend on entertainment, which is why this variable was added. This
after-tax income is also calculated using the TAXSIM data by subtracting taxes paid or adding
tax refunds received to the household’s reported total before-tax income.

2) α2 S t , Size of Household as Reported by CEX
The size of the household includes all those living within the consumer unit (CU) and
both affects the amount of household income and size of the tax refund due to the Additional
Child Tax Credit. Additionally, larger households would presumably spend more on
entertainment.

3) α3 Rt , Calculated Tax Refund According to TAXSIM Output in CEX
Tax refund amounts as calculated by CEX are merely estimates of the amount of tax
refunds these households expect to receive, however they are a crucial independent variable for
testing the hypotheses.

4) α4 D t=1,2,3,4 , Dummy variables reflecting the four interview periods
These dummy variables refer to March 2015 and 2016 as well as June 2015 and 2016,
whereas the interview for March reflects spending for the past quarter (December, January,
February) and June reflects spending for March, April and May.
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This stage of the model attempts to measure sensitivity of entertainment spending to
changes in timing across the time periods. Therefore, understanding whether there was an overall
change in entertainment spending across these time periods will allow us to cement whether or
not there was a pattern of change during the same time period as when the PATH Act was
enacted. Any statistically significant changes in the coefficients of the dummy variables ( α4 )
would support the first hypothesis.

Second Stage Regression Model:

C e, t = α1 I t + α2 S t + α3 Rt + α4 Dt=1,2,3,4 + α5 R * Dt=1,2,3,4
The Second Stage regression includes the same variables as the First Stage, but also
includes four other added independent variables:

5) α5 R * D t=1,2,3,4 , Interaction Terms between refunds and the dummy variables reflecting the
four interview periods

This stage of the model attempts to measure the changes in entertainment spending as a
result of changes in refund timing. Therefore, in order for the second hypothesis to be supported
by the data, there should be changes in the coefficients of the four interaction terms ( α5 ) that
align with the PATH Act’s postponement of refunds. Any changes in these coefficients that are
statistically significant would provide basis for supporting the second hypothesis of this study.
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In order for the data to support the third hypothesis, there needs to be a deferment in
entertainment spending that is a result of the refund amounts. Therefore, the timing changes of
the refunds should be reflected by the spending patterns. For example, March 2015 should then
have a larger interaction coefficient than March 2016. This is due to 2015 being Pre-PATH Act,
which would indicate that these households should have received their refunds in March of that
year and spent part of them on entertainment. In March 2016, however, post-PATH Act, this
refund would have been received in the June interview period. Therefore, we should see a larger
coefficient in March 2015, indicating a greater effect of refund amounts during this period on
entertainment spending as a whole. Conversely, then, we should expect June 2016 interaction
coefficients to be larger than June 2015.
Summary statistics and analysis of different factors within the regressions will both
provide sanity checks and also better holistically explain the picture. Understanding the
differences between the averages of entertainment spending across the different periods and
seeing if there is a statistically significant difference could provide support for the first
hypothesis. Correspondingly, a statistically significant decrease between average entertainment
spending in March 2015 and March 2016 and a statistically significant increase between June
2015 and June 2016 could provide support for the second and third hypotheses. However, the
regression is the main focus of this study given that the analysis is much more robust.
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RESULTS
I.

Summary Statistics

Table A: Entertainment Spending and Tax Refund Summary Statistics
(in $USD)

N

Min.

1st
Quartile

Median

3rd
Quartile

Max

Mean

SD

All Periods (March, June of 2015 & 2016)
Entertainment
Spending

1105

2

105

189

302.5

4640

266.33

342.44

Tax Refund Amount 1105

1

581

2822

5050

9257.69

3128.63

2545.16

March, 2015
Entertainment
Spending

290

3

120

200

340.75

4640

306.96

438.06

Tax Refund Amount

290

1

510

2818

5386

9038

3149.57

2645.35

Entertainment
Spending

258

5

99.25

169

270

4511

255.29

385.74

Tax Refund Amount

258

7.65

496

2694.99

4306.5

9075.5

2974.34

2445.41

Entertainment
Spending

274

2

118

193

310.75

2169.33

250.9

256.31

Tax Refund Amount

274

1.81

640.16

2957.47

5460

8928.82

3217.52

2586.17

Entertainment
Spending

283

6

96

186

300

1873

249.7

246.76

Tax Refund Amount

283

4.48

740.54

2959.65

4900.61

9257.59

3150.78

2499.36

March, 2016

June, 2015

June, 2016
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Table A provides the summary statistics for the different entertainment spending and tax
refund amounts across all four periods. Notably, the tax refund amounts throughout all four
periods do not differ much. It is also important to note that the differences between the averages
of entertainment spending in March 2015 and March 2016 and the differences between the
averages of June 2015 and June 2016 are not statistically significant as shown by Table B below.
Nonetheless, there is a much greater change and drop in entertainment spending between March
2015 and March 2016, whereas June 2015 and June 2016 seems to have almost no change in this
spending.

Table B: Differences in Entertainment Spending
N

2015 Mean

2016 Mean

2015 SD

2016 SD

Difference
in Mean

Entertainment Spending
March

548

306.96

255.29

438.06

385.74

(51.67)

June

557

250.9

249.7

256.31

246.76

(1.20)

Moreover, Table C below demonstrates the comparison of differences between March
2015 and June 2015 and then March 2016 and June 2016. Those in the same year come from the
same sample, however, the same CUs might not be represented due to changes in their own self
reporting that could have affected their refund amounts or whether or not they spent on
entertainment for that quarter. Notably, the differences between March 2015 and June 2015 are
not statistically significant although they are large in comparison to the small difference in
between March 2016 and June 2016.
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Table C: Differences in Entertainment Spending (Same Year)
N

Mean

SD

March

290

306.96

438.06

June

274

250.9

256.31

March

258

255.29

385.74

June

283

249.7

246.76

Difference

2015
(56.06)

2016

II.

(5.59)

Regression Results
As discussed earlier, in order to test the first hypothesis, the differences between the

control groups (i.e. 2015) and experimental group (i.e. 2016), must be statistically significant.
The first stage regression is similar to the one conducted in Parker’s study (1999), although
altered to better test the hypotheses.
Table D: First Stage Regression2
Coefficient

Std. Error

0.0021**

0.0005

Size of Household

-3.3352

8.1564

Tax Refund Amount

0.0068

0.0048

Mar-15

224.2121**

28.8552

Mar-16

166.4086**

29.0089

Jun-15

161.231**

29.6759

Jun-16

158.1724**

29.0924

Income

The first primary result of the regression is that entertainment spending varies
significantly due to the total after-tax income of households as well as the period in which the

2

*P-Value <0.05 and **P-Value<0.01
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spending occurs. Notably, although there is a decline of $57.80 between the coefficient of March
2015 and March 2016, this decline is not quite statistically significant. Similar to the pattern in
the summary statistics, the differences between June 2015 and June 2016 are almost nonexistent,
with a decrease of $3.06. Moreover, the difference between coefficients of March 2015 and June
2015 ($62.98) are not quite statistically significant either, although the difference in March 2016
and June 2016 are a lot smaller in comparison ($8.24).
The second stage regression is an extension of the first stage regression in order to be
able to test the second and third hypotheses. Here, the focus of the regression are the interaction
terms of tax refund amounts and the period dummy variables. The interaction term of tax refund
amount and June 2016 is the default baseline coefficient, meaning that it is zeroed out. Table E
below shows the results:
Table E: Second Stage Regression
Coefficient

Std. Error

Income

0.0021**

0.0005

Size of Household

-3.034

8.1622

Tax Refund Amount

0.0071

0.0048

Mar-15

222.57034**

28.8919

Mar-16

166.0967**

29.0619

Jun-15

159.92024**

29.7285

Jun-16

156.34013**

29.1412

Refund*March15

-0.0118

0.011

Refund*March16

0.0042

0.0118

Refund*June15

-0.0094

0.0113

Refund*June16

-

-
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The first primary result comes from viewing the interaction term between refund amount
and the dummy variable of the June 2016 period. Consequently, there seems to be an increase in
2016 interaction variables overall in comparison. Unfortunately, none of the changes between the
interaction terms are statistically significant. Moreover, it seems as if the interaction terms
themselves are not statistically significant.

III. Additional Analyses
Table F: Differences in Entertainment Spending w/ All CUs
N

2015 Mean 2016 Mean

2015 SD

2016 SD

Change (2016-2015)

Entertainment Spending
March

723

241.64

185.58

407.8

348.56

(56.06)*

June

692

204.61

197.93

251.07

241.88

(6.68)

Table F above includes an analysis of differences in means for all CUs. This adds back
the CUs that were excluded for not reporting entertainment expenditures for the quarter.3 The
difference between the average entertainment expenditures for March 2015 and March 2016 saw
a decrease that was statistically significant when including CUs that had been removed due to
not reporting entertainment spending. Similarly, Table G below is an analysis of the results of
the First Stage Regression including all CUs. The change in coefficients between March 2015
and March 2016, however, is not statistically significant.

3

As discussed in the Methodology section, the original analysis removed CUs that did not report spending on
entertainment for the quarter. This was due to focusing mainly on the patterns created by those who had spent on
entertainment.
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Table G: First Stage Regression w/ All CUs
Coefficient

Std. Error

0.0026**

0.0004

Size of Household

-5.7119

6.9189

Tax Refund Amount

0.0020

0.0039

Mar-15

168.4667**

23.6258

Mar-16

107.3864**

23.3710

Jun-15

124.0932**

24.6038

Jun-16

117.7672**

23.4728

N = 1416
Income

Ultimately, the only statistically significant difference comes as a result of re-introducing
the CUs that were taken out as from the original analysis. As the Discussion below will
demonstrate, adding back households who had not reported spending on entertainment for the
quarter may be useful for this analysis.
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DISCUSSION
In terms of the tests conducted, the data does not support the hypotheses for this analysis,
although there are some patterns that keep appearing throughout the data. Through the summary
statistics, however, there were important characteristics of the data that provided sanity checks.
For example, in Table A, we see that across the four periods, the amount of tax refunds did not
change significantly. Therefore, any foreseeable changes in entertainment spending that could be
a result of these tax refunds would not be due to drastic increases or decreases in the estimated
TAXSIM refund amounts across these periods.
The first hypothesis hinged on the possibility of there being a statistically significant
change in entertainment spending across the control and experimental groups. According to the
summary data, however, this was not the case. Moreover, the changes of the time period
coefficients of the Stage One Regression Model were not enough to be considered statistically
significant. Nonetheless, as seen in Table B and in looking at the time period coefficients of
Table D, there is a sharp decline in spending of entertainment within March 2015 and March
2016. Interestingly, however, there seemed to be little to no change across the June 2015 and
June 2016 period. Although this decline in entertainment spending between March 2015 and
March 2016 was not statistically significant, the small changes across June would imply that
there should have been an overall decrease in entertainment spending across 2015 and 2016 if
the remaining quarters were to stay around the same amounts. Nevertheless, entertainment
spending as a whole increased by almost 3% in 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).
Therefore, either this growth was driven by households who did not receive the ACTC or the
EITC, or the growth was made up by greater increases in spending across the final two quarters.
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In terms of the focus of this study, if this sharp decline across March 2015 and March
2016 had been statistically significant and if the change across June 2015 and June 2016 had
been nonexistent, it may have implied that households used their tax refunds to purchase other
items. Moreover, the data in Table B demonstrated that there was a sharp decline in
entertainment spending across March 2015 and June 2015. This would make sense, given that
the March interview period includes entertainment spending for the month of December, when
many holidays occur. However, changes in entertainment spending across March 2016 and June
2016 is almost minimal in comparison to that of 2015. This is further supported by the same
effect being demonstrated in the coefficients of both regressions. In summary, then, the trend that
appears across all the data is a much smaller change in entertainment spending between March
2015 and 2016 versus June 2015 and 2016 and then a similar, much smaller change in
entertainment spending between March and June 2015 versus March and June of 2016. These
two patterns would then imply that these types of households spent less on entertainment during
these two periods as a whole in 2016. However, given that these declines were not statistically
significant, these results are not definitive and failed to support the first hypothesis.
Although these patterns stood out, they would not imply that the change in timing of the
refunds due to the PATH Act was the reason for these changes in entertainment spending. In
order to come to this conclusion and potentially support the second hypothesis, the interaction
terms for the Second Stage regression shown in Table E should have changed by a statistically
significant amount. Using the June 2016 and Refund amount interaction term as the baseline, this
was not the case as none of the changes across the coefficients of these interaction terms were
statistically significant. Nonetheless, there was a small pattern in regards to the interaction terms

33

for March and June of 2016. Both of these interaction terms were greater than the interaction
terms of March and June of 2015. Given the small difference, however, this may have merely
been coincidental and is hard to interpret. Due to this lack of change across these interaction
terms, the data then failed to support both the second and third hypotheses.
In summary, however, the data might have failed to support the hypotheses set in this
study for several reasons. First of all, some of these households may have access to credit which
would allow them to smooth any sort of consumption when they know they will be obtaining a
tax refund. If this were the case, there would be no change in consumption behaviors of
entertainment spending. Unfortunately, due to lack of available and useable credit card data in
the CEX, the levels of credit card debt could not be studied across these periods to see if this
relationship existed. Second, these households may be using their refunds for other types of
spending and would therefore not impact the amount of entertainment spending as a whole.
Some studies have shown increase in durable good spending or using their tax refunds to pay
down credit card debt (Medenhall et al., 2012; Souleles, 1999). These types of spending habits,
however, were beyond the scope of this study and require a much detailed analysis of the
different spending segments that refunds may be influencing.
Third, this analysis excluded those that reported no entertainment spending for that
quarter due to fears of bias that might result from this self-reported total. Considerable amounts
of households across the data, however, reported zero expenditures for entertainment across the
quarter time periods. They were excluded in order to better focus on patterns of households that
spent money on entertainment in these quarters. Nonetheless, excluding them may have affected
the results given that some CUs in the same sample year reported spending on entertainment in
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one quarter and not the other. As Table G shows, however, there seems to be a statistically
significant decrease in average entertainment spending across March 2015 and March 2016 when
these CUs are reintroduced into the data. Reevaluating this relationship using the first stage
regression, however, this pattern becomes lost in the coefficients. The difference in coefficients
of March 2015 and March 2016 is not quite statistically significant, although it has a P-Value <
0.1. Nonetheless, this statistically significant decline in entertainment spending across March
2015 and March 2016 is promising. Still, this data is not enough to support any of the hypotheses
in this study.
Lastly, another problem within this analysis could be that the timing and amount of
refunds obtained by households may be different from what had been postulated in the formation
of these hypotheses. The amount obtained by households depended on the TAXSIM data, which
was calculated using the interview data that was self-reported by CUs. If some households did
not report the same amounts of income or other certain tax credits, for example, they may have
not obtained the amounts that were expected based on TAXSIM data. Consequently, there was
no way of knowing whether these households ultimately filed their taxes early in 2015. Those
with little to no tax refund according to TAXSIM data (under $100, for example), may not have
cared as much in obtaining their tax refunds as quickly as those with larger amounts. If this were
the case, then the time periods chosen in this study would not be applicable to these households
and their entertainment spending would have nothing to do with refunds during the March 2015
period. This also demonstrates how assumptions on timing of when households would file taxes
and ultimately receive their tax refunds were the foundation for this research. If it were the case
that households received refunds in the same quarter despite the PATH Act, then this may
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explain a lack of results. Moreover, if it were the case that those that qualified for the EITC and
ACTC did not, as a majority, file taxes prior to February 15 before the PATH Act, this may also
explain a lack of results. The latter, however, seems unlikely given the past research showing
how individuals with tax refunds are most likely to file earlier (Rubin, 2017).
Out of the analysis conducted, these were far from the expected results. One of the
greatest limitations of this study were the data constraints. Out of thousands of CUs interviewed
for each period, only a handful fit the criteria of being interviewed in the respective month,
spending on entertainment for that quarter, and receiving tax refunds. Additionally, given the
changes in how entertainment spending is reported in 2017, further data was not available to
determine whether changes that occurred between 2015 and 2016 also occurred across 2016 and
2017. Conducting further research that may consolidate the two or looking at 2018 data, when it
becomes available, and comparing it to 2017 data may prove to be useful. Furthermore, patterns
found within the data left for the potential to analyze other aspects relating to the subject. For
example, given the sharp decline in entertainment spending for the quarter of March 2015 and
March 2016, it may be useful to look across all groups and see if this is a trend that specifically
affects those receiving these tax credits. Moreover, analyzing the potential effects that the PATH
Act had on other forms of non-necessity spending might better explain the lack of definitive
results from this study.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to examine whether shifts in entertainment spending would
occur as a result of shifts in the timing of tax refunds due to the PATH Act. More broadly,
however, part of the goal was to examine whether entertainment spending was not properly
smoothed by households who obtained the EITC and ACTC. This would imply a divergence
from traditional economic theories, such as the Permanent Income Hypothesis, and would have
added to a growing list of literature that has demonstrated how individual actions differ from
many of the assumptions in these theories. Another objective of this research aimed at better
understanding the relationship between entertainment spending by households and tax refunds.
Intuitively, and based on past research conducted on tax recipients who qualified for the EITC,
tax refunds should be positively correlated with entertainment spending. Therefore, it would
have been expected that this shift in timing of refunds would have shifted the timing of
entertainment expenditures.
Unfortunately, there was a lack of concrete statistically significant results that supported
my hypotheses aiming to test these theories. Although this was not the case, drastic drops in
entertainment spending across March 2015 and March 2016 and then similar spending on
entertainment during the June 2015 and June 2016 quarters may imply that this spending went
elsewhere. As previously explained, this pattern was not statistically significant and may have
been explained by flawed assumptions as well as data constraints. Nonetheless, this pattern may
be useful to study. Understanding why these households potentially shifted spending across
categories could benefit the entertainment industry in better understanding how these
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lower-income households trade off their discretionary income. More broadly, however,
understanding where this spending went or whether it was saved or used to pay down debt can
allow for insight into what tradeoffs were made. If the timing of the PATH Act was also found to
coincide with this shift, these insights could better help the IRS and policymakers understand
how the particular provision of the PATH Act altered consumption. Therefore, although it was
outside of the scope of this specific research question, further research should be conducted to
see whether a relationship between tax refunds and another spending category is present using
the theoretical framework proposed in this research. Additionally, more research focused on the
relationship between entertainment spending and tax refunds should be conducted using the
following years of CEX data released.
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